We study how electoral cycles influence student performance in high-stakes examinations in India. Using data from 26 Indian states with staggered election schedules, we find that pass rates are significantly (weakly) higher in Class XII (Class X) state board exams leading up to the state election. We rule out increased public spending as a probable mechanism. The gain accrues only to the regular school-going students and not the private candidates. This suggests that better delivery of educational services by schools through increased teaching efforts, and not grade inflation, through lenient grading, lax exam invigilation, or easier exams, is the key mechanism. Teachers put more effort when the incumbent government desires because the latter controls their transfers and postings. The effects are stronger for Class XII exams, probably because these students are of voting age and thus politically more salient. Overall, the paper highlights that while electoral incentives can boost performance in the short term, the challenge lies in sustaining these improvements beyond election cycles.